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Abstract
COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE 1990s:
A FRAMEWORK FOR
DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
Marilyn R. Rogers

Costs of terrorism are high.
immediate targets of violence,

Beyond the

there exists an audience

of public perception whose fragile temperament is too
often swayed by the seeming randomness of the act.
Resultant feelings of fear which are generated,
masse,

en

serve the "agenda of terror" that the terrorist

uses to further his cause.
momentum,

While the terrorist gains

legitimate governments lose ground when public

confidence in state protection is shattered.

To minimize

such effects, governments must consider a variety of
options to counter the impact of terrorism.
Chapter one focuses on the necessity of
counterterrorism plans which encompass the totality of
the circumstances surrounding terrorist activities.

The

philosophy of viable deterrence is set forth as the
fundamental precept of all counterterrorist options.
Chapter two examines the historical evolution of
terrorist activity from a tactical open warfare
alternative to its modern form as a complicated

cooperative political tool designed to gain and control
power.
Chapter three develops the variables important to
to categorization of terrorist groups.

The

comprehensive typology facilitates analytical
identification of vulnerabilities with which to exploit
terrorist organizations via tailored countermeasure
"packages."
Chapters four through seven contain descriptions
of countermeasures generally available to policymakers
facing the problem of terrorism.

Case examples are

included to illustrate conditions under which such
measures as legal initiatives,

economic sanctions and

various force options have failed or been successful.
Chapter eight contains a multi-dimensional
counterterrorism model designed to simultaneously
consider probable effects of optimal
countermeasures— within changing contexts.

This dynamic

model focuses on three principal areas which should be
considered in countermeasure packaging:
countermeasure,
environment.

the specific

the terrorist group and the political

Policymakers are provided with a range of

countermeasures which can be applied in a wide variety
of situations.
iv
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C h ap t e r I

Introduction

Terrorism is a phenomenon which has plagued
civilized societies throughout recorded history.
bound by moral conventions,

Not

the terrorist seeks to

manipulate and maneuver others into a debilitating state
of fear.

It is not the toll of lives which makes

terrorism repugnant,

for those deaths have been

relatively minor when compared to the consequences of
conventional homicide or even automobile accidents.
Rather,

the danger inherent in terroristic violence is

that it penetrates the very core of our values and
belief systems,

threatening the order necessary to

maintain a peaceful existence.
As isolated incidents,

terrorist attacks are of

minor significance in the global arena.

But,

like

dozens of small fires smoldering in the forest,
capable at any time of dramatic resurgence,
chaotic reaction.

they are

prompting

Nevertheless, whereas it may be

difficult to obliterate the fires, measures can be taken
to diminish the effects and protect society from
large-scale destruction.

Because terrorism is an international phenomenon
that cuts across both geographic and cultural
boundaries,

it is necessary to formulate a strategy

which allows responsiveness in a wide variety of
situations.

Decision-makers must be able to understand

motives of the actors involved,

the actual deeds,

probable political repercussions of the acts and the
state risks involved in mounting responses.
Nevertheless,

action in virtually every case is

necessary to bolster governmental legitimacy— even if
responses are primarily symbolic.

If terrorists are

allowed to violate with impunity the established laws
and practices of sovereign governments,

the danger then

exists that respect for the authority of the state may
diminish from within.

Statement of the Problem

A pragmatic approach to the problem of terrorist
violence is needed.

Efforts by the U.S.

in the past to

counter terrorism reveal a general focus on an
hierarchical method of assigning countermeasures.

What

is needed is an appropriate countermeasure "package"
that coincides with the particular terrorist threat.
This package can be flexible enough to consider the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the terrorist

activity.

It may not always be optimal to decide

between sanctions, but rather to assign a variety of
measures aimed at deterring the terrorist activity of a
particular group or state.
Essential in determining the appropriate
countermeasure to assign to each incidence of terrorism
is an analysis of the vulnerabilities of subversive
groups.

To do this, an all-encompassing typology of

terrorist groups must be established.

The first part of

this thesis depicts such a classification scheme that is
responsive to the dynamic nature of terrorism.

Although

basic terrorist activity is not a new occurrence,
nonetheless evolved into a more complicated,
cooperative venture.

it has

often

The typology developed herein will

provide immediate access to the potential
vulnerabilities of groups identified as responsible for
terrorist activities.

Much of the information contained

in the classification scheme is assuredly known to
government analysts who currently study terrorist groups
and some data necessary to respond to terrorist acts may
exist in various information bases.

In those cases where

perpetrators of threats/violence are unknown,

evidence

must be gathered in an effort to further build data
bases.

Subsequent to the identification of terrorist

groups,

the typology can be utilized to reveal

locations/ strengths and weaknesses of the terrorists.
The legal system and the model can, at that point, be
utilized to establish which available responses are most
appropriate for that group at that point in time.
The remainder of the thesis outlines various common
responses to terrorist activity.

Possibilities range

from economic and diplomatic sanctions to covert and
even overt military action.
measured,

The response should be

depending upon the contextual circumstances of

the terrorist act, the group believed to be responsible
and the overall existing world political situation.
While decision-makers ideally have well-developed
contingency plans in the event of an attack,

they are

generally limited to sequential responses which do not
take a realistic view of the dynamic environment in
which terrorism takes place.
The developed model will be geared to terrorist
activity that impacts upon U.S. personnel and interests
on an international scale.

Assumptions

This thesis is based on the following basic
assumptions:

1.

Terrorism will not be eradicated, but it can be

minimized and controlled by application of optimum
countermeasures.
2.

Terrorist acts are, within given contexts,

rational,

understandable and predictable.
3.

Notwithstanding support for specific or isolated

terrorist acts, virtually all sovereign governments
conceptually oppose terrorism because of the potential
for social destabilization.
4.

The U.S. Government lacks a comprehensive,

integrated counterterrorist doctrine with which to
effectively control terrorism and minimize its effects.
5.

To be effective,

each terrorist countermeasure must

enjoy widespread popular support,

even if

retrospectively.
6.

The damage potential of terrorist acts will continue

to increase in severity due primarily to assimilation of
destructive technologies.
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Definitional Limitations

As so often occurs with terms that become
routinized with overuse,
widely understood,
definition.

the concept of terrorism, while

seems to evade a universally-accepted

As Dr. James Motley so succinctly explains,

"Terrorism is a phenomenon that is easier to describe
than to define.
Walter Laqueur blames the media, government and
academia for misunderstanding terrorism.

He says that

it is too readily used as a substitute for rebellion,
street battle,

insurrection and guerrilla warfare which

so often leads to inflation of statistical data.
Alex Schmid attempts to solve the problem of defining
terrorism by listing its common denominators.

In over

100 definitions by well-known authors in the field,
twenty-two elements emerged as ingredients of terrorism.
Among those, violence,

force, politics,

were seen as the primary
Still,

"attributes" of terrorism.

lengthy definitions,

Department,

fear and terror

attempted by the State

the Federal Bureau of Investigation and

scholars, have met with little universal acceptance.
Despite the lack of consensus,

terrorism today generally

describes the destructive acts of disenfranchised people
which are designed to gain attention or in some other
way further

political causes.

Distinctions should be made, however,

between

ordinary crime, political terrorism and the situation
wherein a group,

government or military force uses

terrorist tactics for internal security and control.
Murder,

bombings, robbery and other violent acts can be

both criminalistic and terroristic in nature.

But it is

the political motivation of perpetrators which garners
the label of terrorism to certain acts.
Department defines terrorism as,

The U.S. State

"Premediated,

politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence
an audience."^
In sum, today's "terrorist" is generally defined
as a suppressed or non-controlling party whose aim is to
gain attention through fear and who seeks political
power through the "ultimate realization" of the
righteousness of his cause.
But to have arrived at this central concept of
what terrorism is and, more importantly,
requires an inherent value judgement.

is not,

Arnold considers

the definition problem of terrorism merely a distinction
between means and ends.®

For example,

the Italian

judge in the Achille Lauro hijacking case stated that
the terrorist had "a just cause, flawed by bad means."

8

Martha Crenshaw agrees with Arnold in that some
terrorists enjoy widespread
the ends they serve.

"legitimacy" depending on

She believes a "neutral"

definition of terrorism is needed so that the use of it
.

can be judged either legitimate or illegitimate.

7

Chomsky also views the western world as having molded
the definition of terrorism upon our own ideology to
ensure the good guys are not terrorists and bad ones
are.8
Laqueur notes that,
. . .disputes about a comprehensive, detailed
definition of terrorism will continue for a
long time, that they will not result in a
consensus, and that they will make no notable
contribution towards the understanding
of terrorism.
Knowledge with respect to definitional
constraints will do little to solve the seemingly
unrelenting problem of terrorism.

A consensus would,

however, provide a basis of agreement from which to
study terrorist groups and potential countermeasures.
The purpose of this study is not to determine an
appropriate definition of terrorism.

It is a complex

problem which evades simple solutions.

Most scholarly

definitions incorporate the ingredients Schmid collected
from experts in the field of political violence and
terrorism.10

The media,

the public,

scholars,

government officials and policy-makers may not have

9

achieved a precise,

shared meaning of "terrorism" but

ultimately they all understand it as anti-social
activity which is unacceptable in the international
arena.

Theoretical Constructs

"The interest of the USA in preventing terrorism
in the future can only be served by resisting it
in the present.1,1 1
Assuming the identity of a potential terrorist can
ultimately be uncovered,

the next step entails deciding

which counterterrorist option is most likely to prevent
future acts.

There are two basic options for a

government faced with the threat of political violence:
defense and deterrence.
Defense involves forcefully preventing an enemy
from attacking by means of preemption and prevention.
It requires extensive preparation and an accurate
intelligence network advising on specific potential
terrorist plans.

Levy and Rodriguez examine the

success realized by employment of defensive measures
designed to counter specific forms of terrorism.

They

point out that in the early 1970s, airplane hijackings
increased at an alarming rate in both the U.S. and in
Western Europe.

The resultant use of sky marshalls and

eventually pre-flight passenger screening met with

10

considerable success in stemming the skyjackings.1^
Bombings of embassies and automobiles by terrorists
further led to the implementation of additional physical
measures where vulnerabilities existed.
defensive measures, however,

Even the best

can ultimately be defeated

by a terrorist group through the differential selection
of targets.

Jenkins believes that the greatest

advantage terrorists have is their virtually unlimited
range of targets.

1?

J

If one target is well protected,

terrorists are able to concentrate on "soft" targets
that are not as well protected.

While defense is a

necessary aspect of a counterterrorism plan,

it seems

inherently a reactive strategy largely determined by the
activity of the terrorist.
Policy development,

moreover,

relies on the

principle of deterrence— a cost-benefit differential.
Morgan defines deterrence in its simplest terms as "the
use of threats of harm to prevent someone from doing
something you do not want him to d o . " 14
Explaining this theory, Wilson examines various
aspects of state power and citizen acquiescence of
individual rights.

He observes that philosopher Thomas

Hobbes believed that man is a calculating being,

one who

needs control to protect himself from conflicts of
1C
t
desires.
Hobbesian philosophy holds that it is the
government's responsibility,

therefore,

to protect

11

citizens both from each other and from foreign threats.
In exchange, men cede their

rights to the government,

because the result is a net

advantage for them to

Beccaria,

do so.

the 18th Century Italian criminologist,

elaborated on Hobbes'

premise by asserting that men are

rationally self-interested and normally will not violate
society's norms when the perceived costs outweigh the
benefits.

Notwithstanding that this "classical" school

of thought is disputed by some observers of human
nature,

it forms the fundamental basis of our system of

punishment for crimes.

The theory of deterrence also

applies to countering terrorist activity.

While it is

recognized that punishment may not deter a
religiously-inspired zealot

hoping to die for his

it can have an impact on the state

cause,

or religious

organization which is motivating him to commit acts of
violence.
The theory of deterrence aims to prevent conflict
by convincing the adversary that the cost of the
contemplated action far outweighs any potential gain.
In the U.S.

it is the government's goal to influence

terrorists'

decisions by threatening,

manner,

in a believable

that "unacceptable damage" will be the direct

result of a terrorist act.

The purpose of a strategy of

12

deterrence is to affect the perceptions of a terrorist
group so that the value-maximizing opponent will react
to an effectively communicated and credible warning by
desisting from planned acts.
The use of a deterrence theory to minimize
terrorist activity implies that the terrorists are
rational.

Evidence collected by Jenkins,

Johnson and

Ronfeld indicates a high percentage of success by
terrorists in achieving specific g o a l s . S a n d l e r ,
Tschirhart and Cauley find this "success rate" evidence
of rationality.

"One must remember," they note,

an actor's goals do not determine rationality;

"that

rather,

it is an actor's pursuit of these goals in the face of

.

constraints.

. .

17

Stohl also rejects the

misconception of terrorists as madmen and encourages
that policymakers recognize the fact that terrorists are
"serious political a c t o r ( s ) .

He believes this

realization will aid in the formulation of more
effective counterterrorist policy.
Crenshaw envisions U.S. policy utilizing two forms
of deterrence.

The first type of deterrence she labels

"denial," which closely resembles a policy of defense.
The government's intent is to deny "gain" to the
adversary,

thereby raising the cost of any action the

terrorist takes.

The second type of deterrence is

13

"punishment" or "retribution."
responses to terrorist acts.

This represents ad hoc
Punishment can either be a

measured response intended to "fit" the initial
terrorist act or it can be an escalation designed to
show resolve in the fight against terrorism in general.
Military force, either covert or overt,

is often cited

as a viable punishment/retaliation response intended to
deter future acts.

1Q

3

Crenshaw also identifies several problems with a
governmental polity of deterrence.

Perhaps the most

obvious problem that has faced U.S. policymakers is the
fundamental difference in values between western and
middle eastern peoples.

This difference can provoke

escalation when actions are misperceived and when
opposing forces are willing to take what seems to be
non-cost-effective action.

on

u

In a similar vein,

Morgan finds the major complication in counterterrorism
to lie in determining the proper means for implementing
deterrence.

91

Jervis faults the process of

communication necessary to relay threats to adversaries.
Accordingly, he sees the potential for disaster when:
Signals that seem clear to the sender are
missed or misinterpreted by the receiver;
actions meant to convey one impression often
leave quite a different one; attempts to
deter often enrage, attempts to show calm
strength may appear as weakness.

Thus, deterrence theory demands that policymakers
have accurate views of the other side— the terrorists'
world view as well as their own views of the situation.
As Jervis explains,

these images "influence the other's

behavior in general and its reaction to the state in
particular.

. .a first step is to grasp the other side's
.

values, beliefs and perceptions."

9^
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Chapter II

The Evolution of Terrorist Activity

In

order to implement a counterterrorist plan, it

is important first to understand how the nature of
terrorism has changed over the centuries.

What began as

an alternate tactic to open warfare has over time
evolved into a complicated cooperative venture.
incidence of terrorism,

Each

as it is illustrated throughout

history, has left its mark on modern-day terrorists.
With an historical perspective, terrorist activity can
be appreciated in light of the changing nature of our
society and the lessons of history can provide insights
into the present and future course of terrorism.

Pre-20th Century Terrorism

Laqueur writes of a terrorist group prominent in
the 11th
based

century known as the Assassins.

in Persia and,

The group was

through successful operations,

spread to Syria, killing governors,
and political leaders on their way.

caliphs,

religious

Their first leader,

Hassan Sibai, realized that as a group the Assassins
were too small to compete successfully in open warfare.
Therefore,

Sibai directed his followers to carry out,

18

what Laqueur describes as,

"a planned,

long-term campaign of terror."*

systematic,

An important element

in the success of the Assassins was their need to
operate in secrecy, disguised as strangers or even
Christians so they could get close to their victims.
This closeness was essential because the Assassins
always used daggers to kill their victims,

symbolic of

the fact that to them murder was a sacramental act.
Some would call the Assassins "fanatics" intent on
defending the autonomy of their religious sect.

Robin

Wright points out that the Assassins were also fearless
warriors who "courted death and martyrdom."

Wright

suggests that Sibai was able to convince his followers
of the "delights of heaven" by administering hashish to
the soldiers before battle.^

They were told that the

euphoria experienced was a foretaste of death and
eternal life in heaven and that dying while in battle
would assure them a like reward.

Much the same

message is perpetuated today in Iran by the teachings of
the Ayatollah Khomeini and his successors.

The

Assassins, however, were eventually defeated in the 13th
Century by perhaps an even more ruthless band of
terrorists led by Genghis Khan.
The legend of Genghis Khan has survived as an
early example of the success of a terror strategy.

Khan

and his Mongolian horde created a mystique of carnage
and destruction as they swept through 13th Century Asia.
The Mongols discovered a psychological phenomenon often
observed in nature:

the debilitating effects of fear.

They found that humans,

in spite of (or perhaps because

of) their superior ability to reason, were, nonetheless,
susceptible to confusion,

disorientation and paralysis

induced by terrifying situations.

By carefully staging

what appeared to be random acts of ruthless killing and
destruction,

the Mongols were able to overrun heavily

populated territories with little resistance.

These

terror tactics, born within the context of traditional
warfare, highlight the value of publicity in terrorist
4
situa t i o n s .
Within a different context— that of domestic
social control— "terrorism" entered the modern lexicon
during the aftermath of the French Revolution.
Genghis Khan and his Mongols,

As with

Robespierre and the

revolutionaries needed a tactic to subdue superior
numbers.

The "reign of terror," although excessive and

eventually counter-productive,

served to intimidate

opponents through fear and uncertainty.

Similarly,

the

20th Century Russian Bolsheviks found terrorist tactics
to be useful— perhaps essential— in subduing potential
domestic opposition to their tenuous control of government.

A contemporary practitioner of terrorism has much
to learn from these predecessors.
that a smaller,

The Assassins proved

less capable group of opponents could

project power by operating in secrecy.

Their

fearlessness was enhanced by instilling a spiritual
aspect which helped to convince followers of the
righteousness of their cause.

The value of publicity

designed to intimidate adversaries was exemplified by
Genghis Khan and the leaders of the French Revolution.
Likewise, the Bolsheviks demonstrated the value of
institutionalizing fear in the population to control
domestic opposition.
elements— secrecy,
for publicity,

Some or all of these

fanatic religious obsession,

a need

as well as fear and intimidation— are

practiced in various forms by terrorists today.

Where

the dagger may have been replaced by the suicidal truck
driver,

the effect on the general population is still

the same:

terror and frustration.

Modern-Day Terrorism

Terrorism in the latter half of the 20th Century
is all of the above and more.

Certainly it depends upon

the same psychological principles intuitively recognized
by the Assassins,

successfully utilized by the Mongols

and subsequently practiced by revolutionaries who needed
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drastic measures to maintain precariously-held political
power.

But modern-day terrorism has evolved into a

complicated reflection of our complex society whose
history is as diverse as the type of terror practiced by
the various groups.
Terrorism in the first half of the 20th Century
was mainly used in nationalist-separatist movements by
right-wing political groups.

Two primary centers of

activity were Macedonia and Palestine.
located in southeast Europe,
nations,

Macedonia,

is a "meeting place" of

a fact which surely contributed to its complex

and turbulent history.

Settled in the 6th Century by

Slavs, Macedonia was successively dominated by the
Byzantines

(9th Century),

the Serbians

and eventually the Ottoman Turks

(14th Century)

(14-19th Centuries).

In the 1800's, nationalist revivals in the Balkans
reignited, heightened by the Ottoman policy of playing
one group against another.

A secret terrorist

organization sprang up at this time which worked for
Macedonian independence and which was supported by
Bulgaria.

The end of World War I saw a continuation of

state-sponsored terrorism,
Durant,

directed, according to

largely from Bulgaria.

The Internal Macedonian

Revolutionary Organization practiced terrorism in
Yugoslavia with some success inasmuch as Macedonia was
then a constituent republic within Yugoslavia.
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Palestinian nationalists turned to terrorist
tactics after the British announced a complete
withdrawal of troops by August of 1948.
countries,
protest.
1947,

Other Arab

in support of the Palestinians, voiced strong
Gabbay reports that, as early as December

the Arab Premiers met in Cairo and secretly agreed

"to arm Palestine Arabs,

reinforce them with volunteers

and collect funds to finance an all-out fight in
Palestine.
This Cairo Declaration, however, was by no means
the first incidence of terrorism in Palestine.

As early

as the 1920's, Arabs opposed to Jewish occupation
attacked settlements in Tel-Chai,

a northern Zionist

settlement in Jerusalem and in Hebron.

Arab terror met

with Jewish counterterror led by the famous Zionist,
Vladimir Jabotinsky.
began,

Once the 1948 Arab-Israeli war

small Jewish terrorist organizations had begun a

strategy of terror operations designed to liquidate Arab
opposition.

Shipler reports that the Irgun,

organization headed by Menachem Begin,
village on April 9, 1948,

a terrorist

attacked an Arab

and killed 250 inhabitants.

News of the killing of innocent civilians was widespread
and Begin allegedly reported that the propaganda value
of the deed was,

"worth half a dozen battalions to the
D

forces of Israel."
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In the decolonization process after World War II,
terrorism was widespread in such countries as Cyprus,
Aden and Algeria.
often innocents,

Although these victims of terror were
they remained largely confined to the

terrorist's homeland and reflected the goals of the
terrorist activity.

Inter-Group Cooperation

During the last fifteen years the nature of
geopolitics has changed such that purely national
interests have become less important as a concern of the
terrorist.

Cooperation between different terrorist

groups has provided the aggressor with a vastly expanded
logistical and tactical potential.

As Laqueur relates:

Multinational terrorism reached a first climax
in the early 1970s. . .a new species of terrorism
emerged, an almost impenetrable maze of linkages,
intrigues, common and conflicting interests,
including open and covert collaboration with
foreign governments who preferred to stay in
the s h a d o w s .9
One reason for the internationalization of
terrorism is the changing nature of our global society.
Jenkins cites the jet, coupled with vast improvements in
news coverage in all parts of the globe,

as a major

reason for increased interest in foreign a c t i v i t i e s .
A primary reason for the increased emphasis on
terrorism in the Middle East is the failure of the Arabs
to achieve success in their quest for victory over
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Israel.

The Palestinians have been forced to turn to

more pragmatic tactics following repeated diplomatic and
military failures.

Goren describes many cooperative

terrorist ventures initiated by the Palestinian
Liberation Organization

(PLO).

Examples are:

the Air France hijacking to Entebbe in 1976
which was carried out by both German Red
Army Faction (RAF) members and the PLO; the
hijacking of the Lufthansa Airliner to
Mogadishu in October, 1977, which was
carried out by the PLO and organized by
Wadi Haddad, who was at that time in
East Germany, as a service to the RAF of
West Germany. 1
A Rand Study in 1985 reveals the "growing links
and cooperation among international terrorist groups,
•

especially

•

m

.

terms of shared intelligence.

consider this trend

“17

They

to be significant because of the

extension of available resources and added flexibility
cooperation provides.
While cooperation among terrorist groups is a
relatively new phenomenon,
difficult to trace.

its actual roots are

We now know that many terrorists

were able to meet and exchange ideas while studying at
the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in the Soviet
Union.

Shultz describes the training the Soviets

provided as a "university education."

The actual

emphasis was on indoctrination in Marxist ideology,
tailored to Third World revolutionaries who were then
tasked to carry the message back to their homelands.
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The students were also trained in such areas as weapons
and explosive operations— handy skills for potential
l^

terrorists.

Other training camps for terrorists have been
established, with the help of the PLO,
throughout the Middle East.

in various places

Would-be terrorists from

Europe, Latin America and Asia receive extensive
schooling in the techniques of terrorist warfare.
The Venezualian-born legend,

Ilyich Ramirez

Sanchez, better known as "Carlos the Jackal",

epitomizes

the strength terrorists have when forces are combined in
cooperative ventures.

In the mid-1960s,

Carlos attended

Patrice Lumumba Friendship University where he quickly
gained a reputation as a radical leader.

But Carlos'

activities were perhaps even too unorthodox for his
teachers because he was asked to leave the university in
1969.

Smith believes Carlos showed such promise as a

potential terrorist that Moscow wanted to be able to
legitimately disavow any overt association with him.
They therefore expelled him from the university,
apparently as a guise to provide distance.

It was

during his schooling in the Soviet Union that Carlos
established ties with the PLO.14

Goren described

Carlos as having links with the Red Brigade,

RAF and

Central and South American groups as well as the
Japanese Red Army

(JRA).

She states that the Popular
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Front for the Liberation of Palestine

(PFLP) also

claimed him as having been one of their m e m b e r s . 15
Carlos aided other terrorist groups by providing money,
arms and intelligence information.

Dobson and Payne

list at least five major European terrorist attacks,
during a period of less than two years,
was implicated.

In July of 1975,

in which Carlos

"the Jackal" killed

two French detectives and a Lebanese informer in a
Paris apartment house during what the detectives
apparently believed was a routine questioning session.
Further investigation into the matter revealed Carlos
had stockpiles of arms,

forgery equipment,

maps of

bombed buildings and lists of potential t a r g e t s . 15
Carlos was also believed to be the mastermind of
at least two operations by the JRA, a combined
organization of student groups which sprang up in Japan
after World War II.

Laqueur notes that,

The Japanese terrorists, even more than the West
Germans, took a prominent part in transnational
terrorism; frequently in collaboration with
Palestinians, but also with the 'Carlos’
gang . . . .17
Goren points to the 1972 Lod airport massacre as
evidence of the beginnings of terrorist group
collaboration.

Three JRA members,

arriving at Tel Aviv

from Paris, picked up their luggage, extracted automatic
weapons and hand grenades from their luggage and began

indiscriminately killing civilians in the terminal
area.*®

Twenty-eight people were killed and at least

seventy more wounded.

This action, although carried out

by three members of the JRA, was actually accomplished
on behalf of the PFLP, reportedly in gratitude and as
repayment for logistics support and weapons training
received by JRA members.

According to Goren,

several

other JRA/PFLP operations were conducted from 1972 to
1975 which laid the groundwork for broader cooperative
terrorist ventures.

There later was evidence of

cooperation between Irish Republican Army

(IRA)

Provisionals and Black nationalist guerrillas for
actions in Rhodesia and Mozambique.

Goren also notes

that IRA members are rumored to have been trained in PLO
camps in the Middle East.
West German terrorist groups,

created in the mid

1960s, have a history of inter-group cooperation which,
according to Levi and Rodriguez,
European borders.

today has spread beyond

Initially, three left-wing terrorist

groups in Germany were responsible for most incidents:
The RA F — borrowing their name from Mao's Red Army— the
Revolutionary Cells
(2JM).

(RZ), and the 2nd of June Movement

A significant level of cooperation between West

German groups was evidenced in 1975 when the 2JM worked
with the RAF to kidnap a West Berlin mayoral candidate.
The operation was successful in that terrorist demands
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for money,

transport to a safehaven and the release of

six imprisoned terrorists were met.
success,

Encouraged by this

continued terrorist operations often involved

two or more groups and the targets of the attacks were
generally U.S. or North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)-affiliated interests.
Italian and French terrorist groups also made a
transition from national/homeland targets to U.S. and
NATO interests in the late 1970s.
enemy"

Having a "common

in the "imperialistic" U.S. helped solidify

inter-group ties and provided a focus for terrorist
activity.
Terrorism in Central and South America is
generally used as an instrument of insurgent groups when
attempting to gain power for a particular regime.
Because many of the countries affected by terrorism are
"democracies"

in name onl y — without the true support of

the population— leadership is often equivocal.

Strong

military opposition to insurgent groups has tended to
drive revolutionaries to terrorist tactics.
and kidnappings,

for example,

Bombings

are more economical to

accomplish and less risky than open warfare for an
outnumbered and overpowered force.

While the growth of

these Latin insurgent groups is steadily rising and the
level of terrorism is on the increase, the threat to
U.S.

interests is generally considered minimal.

The history of terrorism in the Middle East is
often described in the media as an outgrowth of broken
promises and frustration.

Alternately shunned and

dominated by western powers, Middle Eastern countries
have begun to emerge as independent states with a
powerful trump card to use against enemies:

oil.

Nationalism and religious Islamic fundamentalism have a
natural adversary and target in the state of Israel.
Added to this already explosive environment are the many
religious factions vying for power, yet finding it
difficult to coexist.

These ingredients have literally

propelled the Middle East into a terrorist haven over
the last decade.

Cooperation among Arab states and a

variety of religious factions is standard fare there, as
is a policy aimed at the destruction of Israel and the
weakening of the United States.
The legacy of Carlos with his influence on
European and Middle Eastern terrorist groups,

is today a

problem plaguing those who must develop strategies and
policies to counter the growing popularity of intergroup
terrorist cooperation.

Modern terrorist tactics have

become important not only because of the power created
by strength of numbers,

but also because of an

increasing technological complexity.

For example,

the

intergroup cooperation, which began merely as a means to
increase logistical capabilities,

now serves to further
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complicate counterterrorism efforts.

Despite initial

contention in the early 1980s that there was a "network
of terrorism" backed by the Soviet Union,
disproved this.

later reports

90

Laqueur points to an international terrorist
congress which took place in January 1986 in Frankfurt,
West Germany,

as evidence of continuing coordination and

collaboration among terrorist organizations.

Among the

representatives at the congress were German,

French,

Belgium,

Spanish and Portuguese nationals,

as well as

members of the PLO, PFLP, African National Congress,
IRA, the Tupamaros and the Red Brigade.

O 1

Thus,

,

it is

no longer evident, based on logical deduction of
political motives, which terrorist group is directly
responsible for given terrorist attacks.
In December 1988,

a Pan American airliner enroute

from London to New York blew apart over the Scottish
village of Lockerbie, killing 259 people on board, many
of them American citizens.

Early indicators clearly

signalled a terrorist attack.

While labelled by the

U.S. an "intolerable act," determining the source of the
attack has proven difficult.

A British newspaper

claimed that the plane was sabotaged by Iranian
terrorists aided by Libya.

The attack was presumed by

media analysts to be in retaliation for an Iranian
Airbus accidentally shot down over the Persian Gulf by a

U.S. Navy warship during the summer of 1988.

West

German newspaper reporters asserted that the attack was
planned by IRA terrorists aided by a Palestinian group
and Libya.

PLO representatives have implied that the

bomb on board the plane was planted by Israeli agents in
order to undermine U.S. negotiations with the
Palestinian group.

Thus, while the U.S.

is eager for an

opportunity to react to this particular terrorist
incident, without firm knowledge of the guilty parties,
any action would be counterproductive or meaningless.
Not only would the possibility be high of a reaction
aimed at an innocent party, but the value of any
counterterrorist policy would be diminished.

Motley

sums up the current state of affairs:
The increasing coordination among terrorist
groups committed to eliminating U.S. influence
and presence from the Middle East and Europe
requires new thinking about the nature and
character of international terrorism.22
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Chapter III

A Typology of Terrorism

The classification of terrorist groups is an
ominous task— tantamount in many respects to the elusive
undertaking of defining terrorism.
exists for disparity,

A high potential

particularly with regard to the

variables utilized in coordination of the classification
scheme.

And, as is often evident in published

typologies,

a clear conceptualization of the term

"terrorism" was often not made prior to further study.
While,

admittedly,

the body of knowledge which comprises

the study of terrorism is in the embryonic state, the
literature seems quite consumed with the task of
categorization of terrorist groups.
The ability to classify terrorist groups based on
a uniform set of variables could provide analysts with a
structured database from which to conduct further
analysis.

The resultant typology also would then be

capable of empirical substantiation through
comprehensive research.

The ambiguity inherent in the

terminology related to terrorist groups inhibits
critical evaluation of the merit of current typologies.
While typologies differ with regard to the number and
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type of factors considered,
included are;
mechanisms,

some variables generally

goals, motivation,

size,

support

targets selected and tactics utilized by the

group.
The "ideal" terrorism typology would compress the
unique set of variables related to individual groups
into general categories.

However,

typologies rarely

consider all of the above listed variables and often
fail in consistency regarding the factors which are used
to identify given groups.

For example,

one typology may

classify the PLO as a "nationalist" group based on the
goal or motivation aspect but conversely label the
Tupamaros of Uruguay under a "Latin American terrorism"
heading based upon geographic location.

This type of

inconsistency makes cross-group comparison difficult,
not impossible,

because different descriptors were used

to classify the groups.

Early Classification Schemes

Early distinctions of terrorist groups were based
on what Stohl and Schmid term "a group-based
classification scheme."*
FBI,

Attempts were made by the

the CIA, Rand Corporation and others to extract

data that would comprehensively describe terrorist
groups.

if

Concepts such as "left-wing" and "right-wing"

were often used to assess political orientations of
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groups but the criteria were not adequately defined.
Generally,
describe,

a left-wing group was, as Levy and Rodriguez
"fueled by the world Marxist Revolutionary

movement with the support of the Soviet Union,
China.

Cuba and

. . .
Early studies of terrorism merely described

terrorist inicidents over periods of time,
variables as location

listing such

(by country) of a terrorist

incident and the group claiming responsibility for the
act

(by name of group).

This distinction provided

researchers with little more than a chronology of
terrorism, but it did allow early researchers to study
regional patterns of activity.

Other group-based

classifications of terrorism used ambiguous terms such
as "ultraleft anarchist"
right wing groups."

and "neofascist and extreme

There existed, however,

consistency between researchers:
JRA as ultraleft anarchist;
anarchist/nihilist category;

little

Mickolus labels the

Kumamoto puts them in an
Shults and Sloan find the

JRA to be an ideological extremist group;

Johnson

categorizes them as ideological mercenaries.

Thus, the

use of imprecise terms and unsubstantiated assumptions
left a wide disparity when comparing group-based
typologies.

Stohl finds that group-based typologies

provide the researcher with only general knowledge that
has not been empirically tested.^

Many of these
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typologies are informal and based mainly on the
ideological background of the terrorist group.
It is often difficult to isolate the ideology of a
terrorist group from other factors.

Alexander and

Gleason list a terrorist group typology based on the
following ideological schemes:

ethnic,

religious,

nationalist, M a r x i s t-Leninist, anarchist,
extreme right wing,
p a t h o l o g i c a l .^

Neofascist,

ideological mercenaries,

and

Kumamoto presents a similar typology

with labels such as nationalist/separatist,
socialist/revolutionary,

anarchist/nihilist,

Neofascist/extreme right wing and pathological.®
Scholars, however, have not reached consensus as to
which groups best fit into particular categories.

In

order to further expand the variables utilized to
differentiate terrorist groups,

authors added such

variables as motivation and objectives.
Motivational typologies focus attention on the
goals or aims of the terrorists.
Schmid and Stohl,

According to Flemming,

these types of classifications are

often found in literature related to terrorist
countermeasures.®

The problem with purely

motivational typologies,

however,

is that they do not

address the tactics of the terrorist group.

Groups

exist which may have similar goals but which achieve
goals in varying ways.

For example,

separatist or
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nationalist Palestinian groups may all desire
independence, but various factions may have diverse
views about the tactics to use.

Wilkinson suggests that

a classification scheme specifically address the "form"
of terrorism employed.
terrorism:

war terrorism;

rulers or regimes;
governments;

He suggests four categories of
repressive terror used by

revolutionary terror against

and subrevolutionary terror.

In his 1979

revision he added aims and objectives of terrorist
groups as a means of more precise c a t e g o r i z a t i o n . '
Further delineation of terrorist typologies
attempt to include the functional variables of tactics
and targets.
targets;

Fattah discusses immediate and secondary

appropriate and inappropriate targets;

accessible;

and inaccessible targets;

and personalized

p

and generalized targets.

Bell lists the specific

tactics generally seen in various forms of terrorism.
Criminal terror,

for example, encompasses air piracy,

kidnappings and extortion;

psychotic terror involves

threats or attempts on the lives of political
9
f i g u r e s .3

Advanced Classification Schemes

More intricate typologies have evolved which are
designed to consider terrorist group "causation" as well
as support mechanisms.

Thus, terms such as
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"international,

transnational,

domestic and state

terrorism" are generally contained within what Stohl
labels origin-based typologies.*®

Environmental

factors are often added as variables in these
typologies.

These factors generally are lists which

help to ascertain the geographic area of concern of
specific groups.

Still,

debate exists as to which

groups fall within the categories.
groups,

Some terrorist

for instance, perpetrate violence both "at home"

and in the international arena.
In an attempt to demonstrate the changing nature
of terrorist motivation in the 1980s, Hoffman examines
the underlying ethical foundations of this type of
violence.

He compressed all terrorist activity into two

categories:

secular-political and religious-political.

He characterizes the secular political actor as one who
desires power in the form of a separate nation-state,
socialist state or an authoritarian state.

a

This actor's

main objective is sociopolitical change in the world.
The religious-political terrorist desires change also,
but motives are based on religious or theological
imperatives.

Hoffman states that,

"rather than

regarding violence as a means to an end, these groups
often view violence as an end in itself."**
Psychological profiles of terrorists have also
become popular,

particularly among scholars.

Gurr views
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the merits of this analytical approach on two levels.
In one respect,

psychological analysis of individual

terrorists helps to answer the questions of motivation.
Biographical sketches and interviews with terrorist
operatives can also aid in the assessment and
identification of personnel, revelation of individual
modus operandi,
favored tactics.

and profiling of potential actors or
Gurr posits an interesting

psychological typology that deals with recruitment of
terrorists.

He states that the "making" of a terrorist

proceeds through three phases:
(1) At the first stage an existing organization
which advocates political violence attracts
potential recruits from young people in groups
which already have intense grievances. . . .
(2). . .new members are socialized into the
organization's goals and subjected to
encouragement and pressure. . . .
(3) . . .the utilitarian mode of behavior becomes
increasingly important. . .committment to the
group. . .rationalistic mode of thought. . . .
Gurr's typology attempts to explain the thought
process that a terrorist goes through in order to become
a part of the group.

He must first be committed to a

political cause which he feels he can win.

The

socialization process further solidifies the individual
into a mode of thought that puts the group's goals
before his own.

Finally,

the potential terrorist uses

rationalization to dispel any feelings of doubt about
the methods practiced— the group has become all
important.
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Similar to psychological profiling of terrorists
is examination of the values and beliefs of terrorists.
Crenshaw states that terrorist belief system analysis
has been an area of neglect in the overall study of the
field.

She believes that,
A general framework for the analysis of the
content of terrorist belief systems is necessary
as a basis for case studies of individual
organizations and as a means of comparing
and classifying different types of terrorist
g r o u p s .13

Analysts should strive to understand the "enemy"
world view,

the view of his organization and his

attitude toward western democracies.

If terrorists

envision part of their overall strategy as encompassing
self-sacrifice,

it obviously implies that a deterrent

strategy involving physical punishment would only serve
the interests of the terrorists.
Looking at the evolution of typologies,

Stohl

attempts to "establish a research tradition that
recognizes the utility of previous a n a l y s e s .

"

The

overall comprehensive classification scheme consists of
four main elements and is intended to serve as building
blocks for future studies.

The first element to be

considered is that of political motivation.

Within this

heading the ideology of a group is considered.
factors as anarchism,

nihilism,

Such

left wing/right wing,

religious and cultural orientation are considered.

Also

under this topic is territorial orientation— separatism,

nationalism or anticolonialism.

In the second category,

the authors differentiate between the geopolitical
origins of groups.

One would ask, for example,

terrorist group is indigenous,

if the

foreign or colonial?

The

third category encompasses institutional orientation.
The determination of the basic targets of a group,
as nongovernment targets or state targets,

such

can aid in

the overall evaluation of the latitude of terrorist
activity.

Finally,

this typology addresses the focus of

attention of terrorist organizations:
revolutionary,

social

single issue, anarchy or repressive.

Comprehensive Typology of Terrorism

While the above three-dimensional classification
scheme attempts to draw together the most important
aspects of the variables influencing terrorist behavior,
for the purpose of a counterterrorist strategy it falls
short.

In order to deter future terrorism,

the

variables describing the terrorist group must be
directly linked to possible countermeasures.

Thus,

the

following target group variables should be considered:
-

Overt State Affiliations
International Mobility
Financial Support Mechanisms
Lethal Potentialities
Strategic Goals
Tactical Objectives
Basic Group Ideology
Elements of Group Schism Possibilities
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-

Technological Capabilities
Infiltration Possibilities
Inter-Group Affiliations
Geographic Location of Group

The purpose of classifying terrorist groups
according to the above typology is to enable the analyst
to look for vulnerabilities in each organization.
example,

For

the Red Brigade organization in Italy

discovered that the kidnapping of U.S. Army Brigadier
General Dozier was counterproductive to their cause:
the resultant anti-terror crack-down by Italian police
left the group with few members out of jail.
Examples of other possible terrorist
vulnerabilities include:

internal power struggles;

difficulties in acquisition and transport of high
performance weaponry;
haven;

problems with out-of-country safe

susceptibility to counter-propaganda;

security problems;

target selection;

financial support needs;

physical

increase in

need for frequent relocations;

and personnel problems of motivation,

discontent and

deprivations.
Each countermeasure has specific applicability to
certain group variables.
a diplomatic sanction,

For example,

in order to apply

decision-makers should consider

the overt state affiliation of the group,
location,

its geographic

the international mobility of the group,

inter-group affiliation and the strategic goals and

the
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tactical objectives of the group.

Economic sanctions

would be most appropriately applied to groups with state
affiliation.

However,

other factors to consider include

financial support mechanism,

technological capabilities

and the goals of the group.

The use of force as a

sanction should be undertaken with caution and with as
much knowledge about a terrorist group as possible.
Major factors, however,
the group,

are the lethal potentialities of

its strategic goals and tactical objectives.

Special operations and covert operations also require
the decision-makers to know as much as possible about
the particular target.

They also should take into

consideration the possibility of a schism in the group,
the basic group ideology and the probability of
successful infiltration of the group.
The old adage,

"A chain is only as strong as its

weakest link," also applies to terrorist situations.
comprehensive background analysis of organizations and
methods involved in terrorist activity can provide
information on the "weak link."

That particular area

can then be addressed by the most appropriate
countermeasure— military force, diplomatic,
economic or other sanctions.

legal,

A
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Chapter IV

Counterterrorism Options

Conventional wisdom on counterterrorism is
polarized:

while it seems nothing can really be done

about the problem,

it is apparent that some type of

strategy is necessary.

As of yet, no all-encompassing

plan exists to obliterate the complex causes and effects
of terrorism.

The frustration felt by powerful

countries who tend to be the victims of this violence,
however, has led to some reasonable options in the
battle for political control.
Celmer notes that the United States'
counterterrorism policy is based on a five-point
program.

These points include:

intelligence operations;
steps;

diplomatic efforts;

legislative initiatives;

operations.-^

overt and covert
economic

and military

Finding the most appropriate option to

employ against a potential or known adversary,

however,

requires a consistent yet flexible strategy backed by
decisive action.

States that openly sponsor and harbor

terrorist groups,

for example, can be dealt with through

economic sanctions if that is their greatest area of
weakness.
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Policy Considerations

According to Sederberg, one characteristic of a
strong democracy is its commitment to the rule of
law.

This commitment serves a twofold purpose:

First,

it ensures the relative legitimacy of the state

by instituting legally structured policies of control.
Furthermore,

the rule of law also inhibits the

development of responses to terrorism that may be
indiscriminate and conflict with constitutional as well
as human rights.

Thus,

any policy adopted by the United

States to fight terrorism must be cognizant of the legal
and moral constraints imposed on it by virtue of its
symbolic position in the world as the "great democracy."
Formulating an acceptable counterterrorism plan becomes
even more complicated for the United States because our
vulnerability to an attack lies not within our own
shores, but far away on foreign soil and in the air.
Other democracies,

like Israel, who are not

subjected to the close scrutiny of world opinion, are
able to affect a counterterrorism policy consistent with
state goals.

According to O'Brien,

Israel's basic

counterterror strategy was firmly established by 1967.
He calls it a policy of deterrence through
preventive/attrition strikes.

He further states that,
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These strikes were aimed at three related types
of targets.
First/ they were primarily counter
force attacks on terrorist forces, bases and
facilities.
Second, they usually inflicted
collateral damage since terrorist bases were
generally collocated with civilian targets.
Israel sought to minimize collateral damage
but contended that persons living close to
terrorist bases and supporting or tolerating
terrorist operations must expect (emphasis
added) to suffer from Israeli counterterror
strikes.
Third, Israeli counterterror attacks
were generally conducted in the soverign
territory of a neighboring Arab state and were
intended to influence that state's behavior.

Whenever possible,

the Israeli government does not

negotiate with terrorists,

although Israel has made a

number of exceptions to this rule.

And,

in the course

of a hijacking or hostage-taking incident,

the policy is

to kill the terrorists at all costs, even if it means a
loss of Israeli civilian life.
The Israeli policy was adopted in response to
terrorist attacks by Palestinians after the 1967 June
war.

O'Brien believes that slim prospects of an Arab

victory following this conventional conflict led the way
for terrorism.

Thus,

".

. .the PLO emerged as a

quasi-independent political-military actor,
to wage a war of national liberation."4

determined

Opponents of

this often-controversial policy are forced into silence
by the apparent overwhelming approval of the strategy by
the Israeli population.
deter,

The goals of the state— to

prevent or retaliate— are met.
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Unlike that of Israel,

the counterterrorism policy

of the U.S. government is often veiled in
ambiguity.

political

The goal of deterring terrorism is

constantly weighed against such competing factors as
economic stability,

foreign relations,

popular opinion

and other issues that dominate current events.

Celmer

believes that the U.S. response to international
terrorism is,

"...based on a complex and broad array of

programs designed to enhance the prevention o f ,
deterrence of, response to and prediction of terrorist
behavior."'*

Celmer admits, however,

that

Congressional examinations of the U.S. antiterrorist
program have exposed key weaknesses that need
correction.

Too many agencies are often vying for a

part in the overall strategy.

Robert Oakley,

former

Director for the State Department's Office for
Counter-terrorism and Emergency Planning complained,
. . . before an antiterrorist plan can be
implemented, his office must consult with other
State Department agencies, the Defense Department,
the Central Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency and the White House.
The very nature of our democracy, however,
that bureaucratic politics
in any strategy.

demands

be a notable consideration

Because of the complexity of the

terrorism problem facing the American government,
solutions also require coordinated effort.

the
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Fighting terrorism on a strategic level is most
difficult because each group has a unique set of goals
it hopes to achieve.

On a tactical level, however,

Celmer states that each terrorist group has the common
goals of publicity.

"Through this coverage, he says,

"a

terrorist group seeks to demonstrate to and inform the
general public of its existence and create an atmosphere
that promotes revolutionary behavior."'
It is the terroristic behavior that produces
publicity which must be countered through a consistent
policy effort.

There are three obvious responses to

counter the terrorist menace:
an incident;

prevent it; react after

or do nothing at all.

The response model

that is being developed is intended to provide
policymakers with a means to "react" to terrorism.
Prevention, while always a first priority,
to measure in terms of success rates.
possible, however,

is difficult

It may be

to preempt a terrorist act by taking

specific action against the group, based on the model
developed.

The key is to look for vulnerabilities

within the terrorist group itself and within the state
supporting the terrorism and thereby exploit those
weaknesses.

52

ENDNOTES
Chapter IV

1.

Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and Reagan
Policies (London:
Mansell Pubs., 1987), pp-12-13.

2.

Peter C. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths, Illusion,
Rhetoric and Reality (Englewood Cliffs, N J : Prentice
Hall, 1989, p. 162.

3.

William P. O'Brien, "Israel's Counterterror Strategies,
1967-1987,"
Middle East Review, (Fall 1987), p. 23.

4.

I b i d ., p . 23.

5.

Celmer, Terrorism, U.S.

6.

Washington P o s t , 6 March 1985, p. A 8 .

7.

Celmer, Terrorism, U.S.

Strategy,p . 12.

Strategy,p. 9.

53

Chapter V

Legal Responses

Examining the basis of counterterrorism policy
calls first for a look at the domestic and international
laws designed to allow our government to respond.

As

early as 1784, America was forced to deal with the
hijacking of U.S. vessels and needed to create a legal
means to sanction offenders.
that,

Thomas Jefferson remarked

"an insult unpunished is the parent of others."

This attitude also seems to be prevalent in modern
times.

Domestic Initiatives

From 1972 to 1988, each Congress has recognized
the importance of security measures established to
prevent and deter violence against the U.S.

The

devasting reality of the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre
created an atmosphere of awareness of the threat posed
by political terrorism in the international arena.
Ninety-Second Congress

The

(1972-73) passed a resolution

unanimously in both chambers of Congress calling for
suspension of aid to nations that support or sanction
terrorism.

The resolution, however, was vague in that
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it did not specify what nations or what aid would be
suspended.
Shortly thereafter the Ninety-Fourth Congress
(1975-76),

adopted language barring aid to any country

that aids or abets, by granting sanction from
prosecution, groups or individuals who commit terrorist
acts.

The President has the power to waive this ban for

national security reasons,

but Congress can override

that action within 30 days.
The Ninety-Fifth (1977-78) and the Ninety-Seventh
Congresses

(1981-82) were concerned with controlling

the export of nuclear fuels and technology.

Monies were

allocated to protect nuclear and chemical sites and
various organizations were restructured to respond to
terrorism.

The Ninety-Sixth Congress

(1979-80)

allocated $2.3 million to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation intelligence program to combat domestic
terrorism.
The Ninety-Eighth Congress

(1983-84) was concerned

with improving security at U.S. embassies and the
Ninety-Ninth Congress

(1985-86) restricted aid to

countries that aid in terrorism.

It also gave the

President the power to stop airline flights to countries
whose airports did not meet security standards.
International agreements with allies to stop terrorism
were also recommended.

The One Hundredth Congress
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(1987-88) passed a resolution to bar the proliferation
of plastic handguns which can slip through airport
security and be used by terrorists in hi j ackings .•*•
Perhaps more significant than additional funds,
extra security measures and extradition treaties,
the measures that were defeated.

are

The 1986

Anti-Terrorist Act, while never passed, would have
authorized the President to use any means,
deadly force,

to include

to deal with terrorist acts committed

against Americans by foreigners.

This legislation would

also have provided a legal basis for preemptive strikes
and strikes against terrorist supporters.
The Executive Branch of government also has the
power to construct the legal means to fight the battle of
terrorism.

When President Eeagan enacted National

Security Decision Directive 138
1984, he initiated proactive,

(NSD 138) in April of

self-help measures

designed to strike back at terrorism.
represents a decision,

in principle,

NSD 138
to use force to

combat terrorism and calls for a greater use of covert
actions,

counterintelligence operations and the

establishment of and use of small military and
para-military operations designed to target
international terrorists and their bases.

Celmer

believes that while the U.S. may now have the "will" and
the legal means to fight terrorists, we have not shown a
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consistency in action to prepare for the battle.

He

cites the selling of weapons to Iran in hopes of freeing
U.S. hostages in Lebanon as a good example of a
hypocritical policy which did much to weaken
international counterterrorist cooperation.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) has also

recently been given a greater role in the investigation
and prosecution of terrorist activity both at home and
abroad.

The 1978 FBI investigation into the death of

Congressman Leo J. Ryan and the wounding of Deputy Chief
of Mission Richard Dwyer while they were visiting
Jonestown, Guyana provided some authority for the Bureau
to investigate crimes overseas.

Larry Layton was

eventually prosecuted for the crime and the district
court concluded that a federal crime was committed if
the victim was an internationally protected person who,
at the time of the offense,
foreign country,

represented the U.S.

in a

even if the offender was not within the

"territorial jurisdiction" of the U.S. at the time of
the offense.

This precedent-setting case,

along with

presidential and congressional legislation and
international treaties has enabled the FBI to establish
functional,

logistical and operational liaison between

the investigative foreign law enforcement agency,
American Embassy,

the

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
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and U.S. military intelligence gencies in the country
.

.

in which terrorist incidents occur.

?

Case Study #1
A prime example of using legal means to snare a
terrorist is the case of Fawas Younis,

the first

terrorist overseas to be brought to the U.S.
trial.

to stand

He was accused of taking three Americans hostage

aboard a Royal Jordanian jet in Beirut, Lebanon,
June 11, 1985.

on

Although the Americans were later

released unharmed, hostage-taking is a violation of
American law.

The FBI successfully coordinated

information from the CIA and the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) to mount the operation against Younis.

Using a

Lebanese DEA informant who was a friend of Younis',

the

CIA was able to record a clear account of the hijacking
and hostage-taking incident.

With the evidence in hand,

the agencies needed a legal means to bring the criminal
to the U.S. without entering any other country's
soverign territory in order to preclude any possible
extradition questions.

Younis was lured to a meeting

aboard a boat for the purpose of making contact with a
drug-runner.

The phony meeting took place aboard a

yacht in international waters and from there FBI agents
were able to arrest him and eventually transfer him to
the United States.4

The message was then clear to
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would-be terrorists— this country is capable of using
lawful means to bring criminals to justice.

International Legal Sanctions

Agents in the Younis case took care to avoid the
entanglement of other countries'

laws.

Nevertheless,

some agreements have been reached on an international
scale that support and encourage legal cooperation
between nations.

International conventions and regional

agreements provide a solid basis in theory from which to
combat terrorism.
Six international conventions supported by United
Nations members have,

in some form,

addressed the

problems of international terrorism.
the Tokyo (1963), Hague

Examples include

(1970) and Montreal

(1973)

conventions which conferred extraterritorial
jurisdiction to try alleged offenders.

The treaties also

provided for the death penalty when the death of another
person results from the commission or the attempted
commission of the offense.
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention relates
to the protection of civilian persons in time of war.
It also provides that the commission of violence,
including murder, mutilation,

cruel treatment,

torture,

taking of hostages and other humiliating and degrading
treatment is considered a violation of the laws of war
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and is subject to criminal sanction.

This article is

applicable even if a state of war is not officially
recognized by one of the parties.
The New York and Hostage Conventions concentrate
on protecting diplomatic personnel and preventing and
punishing the taking of hostages.

The key feature of

all of these conferences requires that an alleged
offender either be extradited or prosecuted.
While most legal initiatives to counter terrorism
have met with little success,

exceptions are possible in

the areas where there is an international consensus of
opinion.
France,

The heads of state and government of Canada,
Federal Republic of Germany,

Italy, Japan,

United Kingdom and the United States initiated an
anti-hijacking declaration at Bonn, W. Germany,

in 1978.

This later became known as the Bonn Declaration.

It

calls for signatories to cease all flights to and from
any country which does not extradite or prosecute
terrorists.®

The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and

Antiterrorism Act of 1986 is also an example of
international cooperation to protect official diplomats
in foreign countries.
Regional agreements,
countries,

specifically within NATO

may be a promising forum for developing a

policy consensus on responses to terrorism.
past, however,

In the

European members have resisted efforts by
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the U.S.

to mount a cooperative response.

the interface of national police agencies,
in laws,

Problems with
differences

the sharing of intelligence and the issue of

national sovereignty are areas that remain sensitive to
international concerns.

Furthermore,

enforcement of any

legal agreement must be undertaken by some designated
group.

The International Criminal Police Organization

(Interpol)

is strictly forbidden to intervene in any

activities of a political,

military,

nature by its constitution.

religious or social

This limitation reduces

Interpol's effectiveness to activity only AFTER an
incident has occurred,

providinig no real deterrent

value to fighting terrorism.

Case Study #2

Withstanding any international legal agreements to
counter terrorist violence,

a political will to act

jointly in a venture must also be present.
1981,

In March

a Pakistani International Airlines jet enroute

from Karachi to Peshawar was hijacked to Kabul,
Afghanistan, by Pakistani political dissidents.

After

killing a Pakistani diplomat on board the aircraft,
hijackers flew to Damascus,

the

Syria, and began

negotiations with the Pakistani government.

After ten

days Pakistan agreed to all of the terrorists'
exchange for the remaining hostages.

demands in

As part of the

deal,

the criminals received safe passage to Kabul.

While Pakistan demanded extradition of the hijackers,
Afghanistani officials denied it claiming that they
would punish the terrorists themselves.

In response to

what western countries perceived as harboring hijackers
the signatories to the Bonn Declaration acted in concert
to suspend all flights to Afghanistan.

This unity of

action by various countries was unprecedented— proving
that collective action is possible.
however,

A major weakness,

identified by Levitt occurs when one of the

"enforcer" countries is politically involved in the
sanction.

None of the countries suspending airline

flights had any particular political dealings with
Afghanistan.

Thus, Levitt states,

"The efforts to

enforce an international norm against hijackers suffer
to the extent that such an effort is affected by
extraneous political considerations."7

Case Study #3

In the case of the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in
June

1985,

international cooperation to ban airline

flights to Lebanon was solicited by the U.S. but never
received.

The hijacked airline was enroute from Athens

to Rome and diverted to Beirut by the terrorists shortly
after takeoff.

During the ordeal, U.S. Navy diver

Robert Stetham was tortured and murdered by the
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hijackers.

The remaining hostages and terrorists were

eventually freed through the intervention of Syria.
U.S.,

The

frustrated by an inability to resolve the matter,

announced it was closing Beirut airport because it had
become a "free fire zone."

The measure stated that no

Lebanese airlines would be allowed to fly to the U.S.
and no flights by any airline would be permitted between
the U.S. and Lebanon.

President Reagan called for

international support for his program, but not one
country joined the boycott.
Levitt argues that the U.S. response was
unsuccessful in this case because the action was
inappropriate and the U.S. government failed to consult
other countries before announcing the sanctions.

If

Reagan had consulted West European governments, he would
have realized,

says Levitt,

that there are fundamental

political differences between the U.S. and Western
Europe over Middle East policies.

The Lebanese

government did not fit the Bonn Declaration paradigm of
a government willing to harbor and aid hijackers.
Therefore,

the signatories to that agreement did not
O

feel m

any way legally bound to comply with it.

Extradition

Murphy notes that there is no universal rule of
customary international law or international convention

which obligates the extradition of offenders to the
requesting country.

Rather, there exists multilateral

and bilateral treaties which generally provide for the
delivery of persons charged with crimes within the
territorial jurisdiction of one state who attempt asylum
within the bounds of another.

Multilateral agreements

for extradition have taken place based on either
geographic proximity or political affinity.

The

principal aim of most of these regional agreements,
according to Murphy is to establish uniform rules in the
.
.
Q
hopes of achieving greater unity.
Much more commonly called upon to resolve
international legal problems are bilateral extradition
treaties.

The U.S. has treaties with over 100

countries.

While each treaty is unique,

principles are universally recognized.
treaty lists the crimes,

several
Usually,

mainly felonies,

extradition will be granted.

the

for which

The offense must be a

crime in both the requesting state and the state of
asylum and must be punishable by a stipulated minimum
penalty,

usually one year.

Some important exceptions to

the obligation to surrender fugitives are often
specified in treaties.

Offenses that deal with

military, religious and fiscal crimes can be excluded
from the terms of the agreement if specified.

Perhaps

the most common exception is that of political offense.
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The political offense exception is defined in
general terms by McLaughlin as,

"...offenses directed

against the state or governmental system or against a
rival group in a struggle for political p o w e r . " 10
Most political offenses are crimes that would normally
be extraditable but that are excepted when committed
with a political objective.

The U.S. has always been

proud of its reputation as a "bastion of freedom" and,

as

such, has been reluctant to excise the political offense
exception from its treaties.

In recent years,

the

ambiguity over what constitutes a "political" crime has
caused interpretation difficulties between the U.S.
and several allies,
Mexico.

principally Great Britain,

Italy and

Until 1985, members of the IRA who committed

extraditable offenses in Northern Ireland and sought
asylum in the U.S.,
exception.

fell under the political offense

In June 1985, however,

a new treaty between

the U.S. and the British included a list of violent
crimes— which would not henceforth be considered
political in nature.
kidnapping,

The exceptions included murder,

aircraft hijacking and the planting of

explosives which could result in personal injury.

Case Study #4

Still, problems exist with other international
extradition treaties.

McLaughlin points out that there
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are problems when a citizen of one state commits a crime
in a second state against a citizen of a third
state.*1

For example,

extradite Abu Daoud,

in 1977 the French refused to

a member of the Palestinian

terrorist group who captured and killed eight Israeli
athletes to Israel because the treaty between France and
Israel did not provide for the extradition of persons
who had committed crimes outside Israel.

In another

example, West Germany refused to extradite Mohammed Ali
H a m a d e i , a Palestinian from Lebanon wanted in the 1985
hijacking of a TWA jet,

because of the possible death

sentence that could have been imposed.

After the U.S.

agreed to forego the death sentence, West German
authorities decided to try Hamadei as a juvenile because

.

. 1 9

he was 16 at the time of the crime.

4

Compounding the legal problem of extradition,
Levitt finds that there are also diplomatic
sensitivities that must be considered.

During the

debate about whether to release Hamadei to the U.S., two
West German citizens were taken hostage in Beirut.

The

kidnapping was directly linked to the treatment of
Hamadei and in particular, his nonextradition to the
U . S . 13
Summary

Essential ingredients of a collective response to
terrorism are outlined by Levitt as credibility,

consensus,

consistency and clarity.14

These prime

factors are rarely present in all situations and the
U.S.

is forced into action either alone or with a

limited number of allies.
however,

Planning contingencies,

may allow the U.S. effective policy options

without escalating the political situation.

Using the

typology of terrorism in Chapter III, those terrorist
organizations vulnerable to legal sanctions,
extradition and prosecution,

such as

can be identified.

A

terrorist group's geographic area of operation raises
the obvious questions of treaties or conventions in
place with which to respond.

Other areas of concern

mentioned in the typology include the group's mechanism
for support and the key tactics utilized.

The past

tactics practiced by a group can also provide clues to
the best possible means to implement the law to counter
terrorism.
Legal santions almost always require the
cooperation of other countries through the use of
specific treaties/conventions and in general an attitude
much like that of the U.S.

Nevertheless,

sensitive

political considerations cannot be overlooked and all
states involved need an in-depth understanding of the
judicial and political systems of its allies.
Extradition treaties must be specific enough to
include persons responsible for terrorist actions.

The
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political offense exception, while appropriate in
instances where persons are prosecuted because of their
beliefs,

is not an appropriate defense when heinous

crimes are committed.

All counterterrorism measures

must be enacted in accordance with lawful treaties or in
response to unilateral laws passed or enacted in this
country.

Action that extends beyond the boundaries of

the law is counterproductive in a democracy based on the
rule of law.
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Chapter VI

Economic Sanctions

As terrorist activity continues to claim American
lives and destroy property around the world, politicians
explore avenues they hope will bring a quick and
efficient halt to the menace.
economic policy,

One of these measures,

is often envisaged as a means to not

only improve American livelihood, but also as an
instrument of political policy capable of manipulating
states'

actions to coincide with U.S.

interests.

Much like military options, which must be tempered
in a democratic environment,

economic sanctions in a

capitalist society are subject to the considerations of
a free market environment.

Sayre believes that because

of the potential disruption to trade, economic sanctions
rarely,

if ever, work.*

However,

if the U.S.

determines that a state is supporting or abeting
terrorist activity,

steps can be taken through economic

sanctions to exert political pressure on that country.
The main limitation to any economic sanction is that to
be effective,

it almost always requires the cooperation

of other countries.

Furthermore, terrorist groups which

have their own means of support and do not rely on a
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particular state for financial assistance,

arms or

safe-haven, would not be an appropriate target of
economic sanctions.
Wooten describes six broad categories of options
against a terrorist-supporting state:
foreign trade and exchange,
aid, export controls,
access.^

restrictions on

technology transfer,

foreign

capital transactions and economic

Some of these options can be undertaken by

the U.S. on a unilateral basis, while others require
multilateral participation.

Any sanction, however, must

be undertaken with both long-term and immediate goals in
mind.

Wooten cautions that it is imperative to obtain a

strong domestic consensus in favor of any economic
sanction where the U.S. will bear some of the economic
costs.
Flores describes several political events which
have hampered multilateral participation in economic
sanctions against states.

For example,

the oil embargo

imposed subsequent to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war placed
oil-dependent allies in an untenable position with
Mideast oil producing countries.

They could not

"afford" the costs of any diplomatic or economic
sanctions that may have impeded the flow of oil into
their countries.

Following the oil embargo and the

resultant rise in the price of oil, Flores notes that
some Arab leaders were left with vast financial
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resources.

Leaders like Qaddafi of Libya were able to

increase their funding of terrorist operations at a time
when economic sanctions were least likely to be
e f f e c t i v e .^
Thus, Flores states,

early U.S. economic policy

with regard to terrorism had three distinct
characteristics:
First, U.S. policies were increasingly
unilateral in n a t u r e ... Se c o n d , the U.S. efforts
to combat terrorism became more symbolic,
and less coercive, in int e n t ...U.S. actions such
as aid cut-off and trade restrictions appeared
to be mere punishments for countries that had
displeased the United States, or gestures
symbolizing the United States' lonely opposition
to terrorism.
F i n a l l y ... Congress rather
than the Executive took the lead in attacking the
terrorist menace.4

Unilateral Options

When forced to respond to terrorism without
support from allies, the U.S. has several options:
trade embargoes,

embargoes on financial transactions,

suspension of foreign assistance,

restrictions on ship

or air traffic or abrogation of treaties.

The

International Emergency Economic Powers Act gives the
President broad discretion in economic foreign relations
when a national emergency has been declared.

While the

President is limited to sanctions which deal directly
with the specific threat to U.S.

interests, he can
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regulate trade and any type of financial transaction
between the U.S. and the country in que s t i o n . 6
The scope of this law is broad and subject to
emergency situations only.
imposed by the U.S.

Nevertheless,

in the past.

it has been

Since May 1985, trade

and economic transactions with Nicaragua have been
virtually halted.

Iranian property and economic

transactions were blocked by the U.S. between November
1979 and April 1980, but were lifted in January 1981.
And a trade embargo with Libya in 1986 was also
justified under this law.

These long-term devices

designed to persuade governments to alter their
undesirable activities have had a limited effect.6
Nicaragua and Libya do not rely on the U.S.

as sole

trading partners and the sanctions imposed represent
little more than gestures on the part of the U.S.
Another U.S.

initiative to resolve state-supported

terrorism is the June 1976 Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961.

It provides for termination of

assistance to any government which,

".

. .aids or abets by

granting sanctuary from prosecution to any individual or
group which has committed an act of international
7

terrorism."'

actions against states,
funds,

.

such as the denial of assistance

food aid and economic or military aid.

however,

.

This law provides for more specific

Flores,

identifies two problems with this type of
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"diplomatic coercion." First, he feels that most states
which support terrorism are not likely to also receive
U.S. financial aid.

Therefore,

leverage with these states.

the U.S. would have no

Furthermore, he feels that

if the U.S. did provide some type of aid to a country
which was then discontinued,

the population who may be

affected by the lack of support might rebel.

The

resultant rising of national passions and anger directed
against the U.S. could actually cause increased attacks
on Americans— the opposite effect intended.
Fear of communism and the traditional view that
U.S.

technology and products are superior to those of

other countries prompted controls on exports following
World War II.

Flores states that from 1949 to 1969,

Americans believed that communism was the dominant
threat to national security.

As such,

the government

placed controls on exports to the USSR and other
communist bloc countries of goods which could increase
their military capabilities.

Pressure from the business

community to alter this policy came at a time when the
U.S.

administration also saw advantages to U.S. and

Soviet trade.

World events,

of Israeli athletes,

such as the Munich massacre

caused the American public to

re-evaluate the focus of threats to national security.
Terrorism was clearly seen as a threat to U.S.
interests.® Thus,

the Export Administrations Act (E A A )
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and subsequent amendments in 1979 attempted to use the
transfer of U.S. products not only to limit the power of
other countries,

but also as a foreign policy tool to

manipulate states'

activities in the arena of terrorist

support.
The EAA of 1979 provides that certain products and
technology should be denied export when U.S.

foreign

policy is clearly and demonstrably threatened.

The

Department of Commerce was assigned the task of
maintaining a list of goods and technolgies which,
because of their potential for furthering the military
capability of a country,

should be controlled by

licensing procedures before export to certain states.
The State Department was given responsibility

for

determining which states to consider as supportive of
terrorism.

In 1979, the first year the State Department

compiled a list of states which support terrorism,
cited Libya,

Syria,

they

Iraq and the People's Democratic

Republic of Yemen (P D R Y ).

Case Study #5

Initial bureaucratic technicalities made the
intent of EAA difficult to put into practice.
for example,
aircraft.

the U.S.

In 1978,

sold Syria four L-100 cargo

The next year, three Boeing 747 aircraft and

two Boeing 727 aircraft were sold to Libya.

One method
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of by-passing the export controls in the early days of
the law was to use a third country as mediary.
January 1980, General Electric

In

(GE) applied for a

license to sell engine cores to Italy, ultimately to be
used in frigates being built for Iraq.
request through all proper channels.

GE made their
The request,

however, was not reviewed by the State Department
because engine cores were not on the control list and
Italy was not on the terrorist-support list.

In April

1980, members of the Iraqi-supported Arab Liberation
Front attacked an Israeli kibbutz, bringing increased
pressure on the Administration to stop the already
approved sale of engine cores to Iraq.

In May 1980,

changes to the EAA insured that exports to the end user
of goods would be controlled.

This modification

prevented a $208 million sale of commercial jets to
Iraq.

q

Flores contends, however, that the EAA has not
reduced the incidence of terrorism.

A major obstacle

is the availability in the world market of the product
in question.

He says,

for example, while Libya has not

received U.S. jets for several years,
purchase them through France.

it can simply

He also states that

export controls without participation of other countries
are basically unworkable.

He complains that,
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The U.S. loses exports at a time when they
are sorely needed. . .the reliability of U.S.
business as exporters is reduced. . .and controls
may gain only the enmity of the countries against
which the controls are directed.10

Nevertheless, Wooten maintains that economic
sanctions, while symbolic in nature when attempted
unilaterally,

are often the only reasonable recourse the

U.S. has to maintain credibility in the fight against
terrorism.11

Multilateral Initiatives

The U.S., while sometimes vainly attempting
unilateral economic sanctions against states which
support terrorism, has also attempted to solidify a
concerted response from western democracies.

One

informal group which has had relative success in
mounting a united counterterrorist offensive is the
Summit Seven.

Levitt describes this organization as

simply the leaders of the world's seven largest
industrialized democratic states— Canada, West Germany,
France,
States.

Italy, Japan,

the United Kingdom and the United

Levitt sees the Summit Seven as a potentially

effective organization because they yield,
and economic weight on the world scene.

".

. .political
17

. . .,|X^

He

further contends that global organizations such as the
United Nations are ineffective in the battle against

terrorism because they are too large and politically
diverse and cannot agree on common measures.
The U.S. has spearheaded efforts to coordinate
economic sanctions by Summit Seven countries and the
European Economic Community against Libya and Syria.

Case Study #6

Prior to 1985, the U.S. repeatedly identified
Libya as a key supporter of international terrorism.
Coordinated terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna
airports in December 1985, prompted the U.S. to
take decisive action against Libya.

President Reagan

charged Libyan leader Qaddafi with providing,
".

. .material support to terrorist groups which attack

U.S. citizens.

. .

i •a

As a result,

a slate of economic

sanctions was enacted by the U.S. against Libya.

The

unilateral sanctions included:
- Prohibition on purchases and imports from Libya;
- Restriction of exports to Libya;
- Ban on U.S.-Libyan maritime and aviation relations;
- Ban on trade in services relating to Libyan projects
- Ban on credits, loans, or the transfer of
anything of value to Libya or its nationals;
- Prohibition on transactions relating to travel
by Americans to Libya;
- Blocking of all official Libyan assets in
the U.S. or in overseas branches of U.S. banks.
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While the U.S.

implored the western democracies to

join in on the economic boycott of Libya,

relatively

little was done by Summit Seven countries to
comply with the U.S. request.

An agreement was

reached by the other six countries to refrain from
undercutting the U.S. sanctions and to limit any
commercial benefit possible from the void left by the
U.S.

They also resolved to stop any export of arms or

other military equipment to Libya.

A lack of enthusiasm

on the part of the Europeans was due in part,

according

to Levitt, to the threat of reprisals that Italy, Spain
and Greece felt likely because of their close proximity
to Libya.
In June 1986, after U.S. military action was taken
against Libya,

all U.S. companies were prohibited from

operating in Libya.

Furthermore,

components and parts,
restricted.

exports of U.S.

destined for Libya were

Subsequent cooperation with European allies

helped the U.S. ban imports of petroleum products into
the United States, which were refined in third countries
from Libyan crude oil.

Levitt states that these

measures have had a positive effect.

He notes that,

"The U.S. economic sanctions and the limited cooperation
given to them by the Europeans,

combined with the

overall drop in world oil prices, have definitely
affected the Libyan economy."

1K
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Case Study #7

The 1988 U.S.

State Department report reveals a

possible new trend in Syrian-sponsored terrorism.

It

was noted that
We did not detect direct Syrian involvement in
any international terrorist incidents.
Indeed,
the diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed on
Syria by the U.S. and European Community in
November, 1986 seemed to have had a salutory
effect on Syria.
Prior to this latest finding on Syria, however,
the U.S. government had identified Syria as being both
actively involved in terrorism and as a harbor for a
number of terrorist groups with like objectives.
Premier among the groups that the State Department
linked to Syria was the Abu Nidal Organization

(ANO).

The U.S. government charges the ANO with more than 90
terrorist attacks in 20 countries since 1974, killing or
injuring nearly 900 people.
Taking the lead in imposing sanctions on Syria was
the United Kingdom.

The April 1986 discovery of a bomb

in the luggage of an unsuspecting Irish woman in
London's Heathrow airport, bound for Tel Aviv,
questions of Syrian involvement.

led to

The British

investigation proved Syrian backing of the bomb attempt.
The Jordanian boyfriend of the woman found with the
bomb, Nizar Hindawi, was convicted in a British court of
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the crime.

British Foreign Secretary

Geoffrey Howe

detailed Hindawi's complicity with Syria to the House
of C o m m o n s :
Hindawi had entered Britain on an official
Syrian passport under a false name; the Syrian
ambassador had been personally involved in
communications between Hindawi and Syrian
intelligence services several months before the
attempt; Hindawi had met with the Syrian
ambassador after the discovery of the bomb; he
had spent the night after the bombing attempt in
a Syrian embassy safe house; and during his
detention he had attempted to contact Syrian
intelligence officials in Damascus to seek
their help in securing his release.
With the overwhelming evidence against Syria in
hand,

Britain undertook several sanctions:

diplomatic

relations between the UK and Syria were severed and
security was tightened on incoming Syrian flights.
U.S.

The

immediately withdrew its ambassador from Syria in

support of the British.
however,

France and West Germany,

took no immediate action.

France at that time,

according to Levitt had two strong reasons for remaining
silent.

First, they were negotiating a $300 million

contract to sell arms to Syria and also they had eight
hostages in Lebanon, held by Syrian-backed groups.
Eventually, however,

France and the other members of the

European Economic Community agreed to a halt in arms
sales to Syria, suspension of visits to their countries
by ranking Syrian officials and closer surveillance of
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Syrian diplomatic buildings and airline flights.

The

U.S. and Japan also levied sanctions against Syria.
Subsequent to the concerted actions of the
European Community,

the U.S. and Japan, Levitt describes

an apparent change in the Syrian posture.

He states,

. . .as soon as a decent interval had passed
without the occurrence of further blatant
Syrian-supported terrorism and certain signs
of an improved attitude had appeared, notably
the closure of some terrorists' offices in
Damascus, Western countries began to
relax their stand. 19
The United States returned its ambassador to Syria
after the closure of the ANO office in September 1986.

Summary

Many factors exist that make desirable the
imposition of economic sanctions against states that
support terrorism.

Generally,

economic policy, when

undertaken in conjunction with foreign allies,

can serve

to unite nations in the fight against terrorism.
Sanctions also have high potential for popular domestic
support because they involve the least direct danger to
U.S.

lives and property.

however,

Care is usually taken,

to ensure that U.S. corporations do not suffer

unintended consequences because of the sanction.
Superimposed on all other practical considerations
of sanctions are the realities of primary foci of
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international relations.

After determination of a

particular state's economic vulnerability to U.S. and
allied sanctions/ each contemplated course of action is
typically— and wisely— weighed against competing
objectives.

Senior policy-makers are continually faced

with potential consequences which may pose more severe
problems than those which originally prompted a course
of action.

One wonders/

for example if it is better to

overlook minor Soviet sponsorship of terrorism/
risk loss of diplomatic relations?

than to

When ties were

temporarily broken with Syria, Levitt reports that the
U.S.

suffered a grave loss in intelligence collection

capability.

Therefore,

foreign policy objectives

must be clearly articulated by decision-makers before
risking an inappropriate counterterrorist response.
Finally, while there seems to be

general

consensus that unilateral economic sanctions have
limited utility, there may be circumstances when such
action is the only available option.

The U.S. has to be

cognizant of the "appearance" of supporting terrorism by
continuing to do business with states that sponsor
terrorism.
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Chapter VII

Use of Force

With few exceptions,

the U.S. policy to counter

terrorism has involved non-violent pressure tactics,
designed to persuade a country harboring or supporting
terrorists to cease and desist.

The missing ingredient

in this response is a clear message to terrorists that
they will pay a heavy cost for mounting operations
against American personnel or property.

One way to

deter terrorists from committing acts of violence is to
let them know in advance that the cost of their activity
will be high and then ensure that the promise is kept.
Developing a strategy that includes offensive
action requires planning which is selective and
procedures which are flexible.

Wardlaw believes that a

policy is necessary which allows for finite
discrimination between terrorists and responses.
contends,
society,

He

that while terrorism is a menace to an ordered
a greater danger lies in allowing the fear of

terrorist activity to force policy changes by states.
He says,

".

. .states must be committed to the policy

which is the real target of a terrorist attack if they
are to provide any true deterrent to future

international terrorism."1

In October 1983

when 241

U.S. Marines in Lebanon were killed after a truck packed
with explosives crashed through the guardposts,

the

foreign policy of the Islamic Jihad was made clear.

The

U.S. policy, however, was less than consistent as within
four months the Marines had evacuated Beirut.

Wardlaw

sees the withdrawal as having the appearance of
vacillation and weakness— the wrong message to send to
potential terrorists.

While the terrorist attack

precipitated the withdraw of U.S. forces from Lebanon,
the underlying issues of appropriateness of the
commitment,

domestic dissent and the Marine mission

#
weighed heavily on the ultimate decision.
hindsight is inherently more vivid,

O

the Lebanon

experience did project an image of the U.S.
to terrorism.

Although

succumbing

There has been an increase in terrorist

activity targeting U.S. personnel since that time, but
there is no way to prove that a perceived lack of
military resolve is the root cause.

Conceptual Considerations

A dichotomy in U.S.

foreign policy with regard to

the use of military force has existed,

according to

Shultz since the end of World War II.

He suggests that

while the U.S. recognizes the need to use military force
in defense of national interests,

there also exists a
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moral desire to find alternate means to settle
differences.

Thus, military power eventually evolved as

a force not to engage in war, but to prevent it.

Shultz

calls this the "peaceful application of military force"
and, as such, sees great potential in a deterrence
•a

s t r a t e g y .J

Nevertheless,

the efficacy of a non-use military

strategy is questionable.

In terms of a nuclear war or

a post-World War II conflict in Western Europe,
fared well.

Unfortunately,

Vietnam or Korea.

it has

deterrence did not work in

The legacy of Vietnam,

according to

Shultz has led some public policy makers and
academicians to conclude that the changing nature of
world politics has

caused military power to lose its

utility.
The onslaught of terrorist attacks, paralyzing
world attention with a fear of uncontrolled violence,
has caused a public outcry for use of force or military
retaliation against the criminals.

The act of "striking

back" has much to offer on a psychological level.
Wardlaw cites the Israeli model of counterterrorism as
one which demonstrates to the population under siege
that they are not merely helpless targets.'4

The old

testament adage of "An eye for an eye..." has also
gained popularity with Americans who feel that the U.S.
is indiscriminately targeted by terrorists.

However,
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use of force against terrorists has required a
realignment of priorities within military and
paramilitary organizations.
Military force can be applied within an overall
counterterrorist strategy in the form of retaliation or
intervention.

The U.S. can use retaliation to "punish"

the perpetrators of terrorist acts, after an incident.
This retaliatory action is intended to send a message to
terrorists that they will

"pay" for their action.

Israeli counterterrorist strategy has become one of
"retaliation" or "reprisals" for terrorist attacks.
O'Brien states,

"The need to reassure the Israeli public

that terrorism would not go unpunished frequently
resulted in a pattern of terrorist incidents followed by
C

retaliatory counterterror s t r i k e s . T h e

Israelis

believed that this type of activity would provide the
best deterrence against future terrorism.

Wardlaw

points out that there are serious doubts as to the
effectiveness of the Israeli retaliatory policy.
Further, he cautions, when the U.S. contemplates
embracing such a policy,
could weigh heavily.

the moral and political cost

He writes that,

We must avoid letting a thirst for vengence
be quenched by turning to tactics which
caused terror themselves, unless we can be
sure that they are precisely targeted on the
offenders and unless we can be sure (or as sure
as humanly possible) that the act will have a
deterrent effect and will not serve only to
provoke future terrorism.
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Organizing an aggressive response against
unconventional adversaries like terrorists will require
a restructuring of military power to address the threat.
The first step, however,

in a planned strategy which

includes possible retaliation or preemptive strikes is
the political will to carry them out.

The ongoing

debate among policymakers as to the advisability of
retaliatory or preemptive action merely adds to the
indecision manifested in U.S. policy.

President

Reagan's closest advisors reportedly disagreed on the
application of military force when countering terrorism.
For example, Wooten stated that, according to press
reports,

Secretary of State Shultz advocated strong

retaliation against terrorists and any country that
supported them.

Defense Secretary Weinberger,

other hand, urged restraint.
has been described by Dr.

on the

The "Weinberger Doctrine"

Edward Luttwok of the Center

for Strategic Studies as a policy that rationalizes a
bureaucratic self-serving attitude.
Weinberger addressed the use of military power in
a November 24, 1984 speech on "The Use of Military
Power."

He examined the circumstances under which the

decision to use force should be made.

He concluded that

six major tests should be applied prior to a decision:
(1) The issue should be deemed vital to the U.S.
national interest;

(2) military forces should be
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committed wholeheartedly,

if deemed necessary;

(3) the

decision to commit forces should be based on clearly
defined political and military goals;

(4) the size,

composition and disposition of military forces should be
flexible and appropriate,

based on the mission;

(5)

there should be reasonable support from the American
people and political representatives;

and (6)

commitment of forces should be a step of last resort.
In mounting an action response against terrorism,
the U.S. has three basic types of forces available:
conventional military and paramilitary forces,
overt and covert forces,

special

and surrogate forces.

Surrogate Forces

Surrogate forces have been used by the U.S. on a
limited basis.

While these efforts tend to be highly

guarded secrets of the administration,

sources in

Washington reported to Newsweek that the Lebanese
government wanted a U.S.

trained "hit team" to punish

terrorists or preempt them.

The CIA trained Lebanese

counter-terrorist unit was allegedly responsible for the
killing of approximately 80 persons on March 8, 1986,
when a car bomb was detonated in Beirut.

The target of

the attack reportedly was fundamentalist Muslim leader,
Sheik Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, whom American
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intelligence specialists believed was involved in the
attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in 1984.7
The Lebanese surrogates,
agenda,

it seems, had their own

separate from U.S. concerns.

problems of lack of control,

The obvious

questionable reliability,

unpredictability and differences in priority appear to
diminish the feasibility of using surrogate forces
except in the most narrowly defined situations.

Conventional Forces

Conventional military forces may be used in a
variety of postures in order to thwart terrorism.

They

can assist in a "surgical" air strike against terrorist
installations,

a selective air attack against terrorist

targets in a sponsoring country,

large-scale naval and

air strikes against sponsoring countries and naval
blockades.

Conventional forces use would necessitate

public awareness of the activity— at least after the
fact.

Examples of the use of conventional forces to aid

in counterterrorism efforts are rare.

The U.S.

raid on

Libya qualifies as a retaliatory action taken by
President Reagan after other efforts to deter Qaddafi
had failed.
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Case Study #8

The Reagan administration began in 1981 to send a
message to Libyan terrorists that violent activity would
not be tolerated.

In May 1981,

mission in Washington,

the Libyan diplomatic

D.C. was closed.

Later that

year, Libyan fighter aircraft fired on two U.S. Navy
fighters.
planes.

The result was the downing of the Libyan
In 1982, economic sanctions such as an embargo

on Libyan oil and curtailment on the transfer of
technology to Libya,

failed to temper Qaddafi's

enthusiasm for supporting terrorism.

Lack of

cooperation on the part of European allies allowed the
Colonel to circumvent U.S. restrictions.

Qaddafi turned

to arms brokers and dealers in Europe to gain spare
parts for U.S. made military hardware.
Shultz,

According to

economic sanctions could have succeeded in Libya

with international cooperation.

He says that Libya's

income is based solely on the export of oil— estimated
at $5 billion in revenue in 1986.
however,

Libya also relies,

on the import of approximately $4 billion of

food and other necessities to meet the needs of the
population.

If the oil revenue had dropped

significantly,

shortages in the country could have

pressured Qaddafi to modify his stance on terrorism.

Before military force was finally applied in
Libya,

Shultz reports that the Administration was

careful to ensure that they could positively answer the
following questions:

Did the U.S. have irrefutable

evidence to prove involvement by Libya?

Could targets

be identified that were linked to the terrorist
activity? Was it possible to isolate these targets to
minimize civilian damage?
support actions?
the U.S.?

Would the American public

And would Western European allies back

Shultz feels that the airstrike was the choice

of last resort for the U.S.

considering the escalating

terrorist activity sponsored by Libya and directed at
U.S.

officials.

He said,

".

. .the administration sent a

signal that there is a point at which terrorism will no
longer be tolerated.

O

This was long overdue."0

The effectiveness of the 1986 Libyan raid is often
debated.

One day after the strike on Libya,
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terrorism experts, meeting at a seminar in Scotland,
agreed that the U.S. had made an error in its
retaliation.

The prevailing view was that the strike

would propel Qaddafi to back increased acts of
terrorism.

Bremer, U.S. ambassador-at-large for

counterterrorism,

disagrees.

He cites as many as 35

attacks planned by Libya that were averted within weeks
of the attack.

He further states,
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. .military actions have nonmilitary
consequences far removed from the scene. . .
the message of U.S. resolve was unequivocal
. . .Overall, there was a dramatic drop in
Middle East-sponsored terrorism in Europe
following our Libya attack and the accompanying
diplomatic and political measures. . . ."
It is difficult to judge the real effects of the
Libya raid on the problem of terrorism.
deterrent value of the U.S.

However,

the

finally backing up

political rhetoric and impotence with action should not
be readily discounted.

Case Study #9

Overt conventional attacks have only a small place
in the overall fight against terrorism.

After the U.S.

Embassy annex in Beirut was destroyed by a suicide car
bomb in September 1984,

talk of retaliation was

addressed by the State Department.
one official commented,

According to Motley,

"There is no sense talking about

retaliation unless you know who is to be retaliated
against."*®

The umbrella Islamic organization known

as Hizbollah was believed responsible for the attack.
The White House was told, however,

that group leaders

and followers do not assemble in one place and any raid
would likely involve high civilian casualties.

The key

questions Weinberger and the Administration asked prior
to the Libya raid were not able to be answered in
Beirut.

The bottom line, however,

rests with the
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question,

"What is to be gained,

and at what price?"

Costs of possible U.S. casualties,
casualties,

innocent civilian

illegal use of force, possible military

escalation and failure have to be weighed against the
immediate and long-term deterrent effects of the deed.

Special Military Forces

Another application of the use of military force
to counter terrorism is the use of forces to "intervene"
during terrorist operations.

One characteristic of

terrorist groups is that they tend to operate in small,
highly trained cells.

The obvious advantage is that it

gives the group flexibility and mobility while
preserving their chances of surprise and survival.
Likewise,
units,

President Kennedy saw the need for military

specially trained and equipped to deal with the

changing nature of warfare.
called for ".

According to Emerson, he

. .a whole new kind of strategy,

different kind of force; and, therefore,

a wholly

a new and

wholly different kind of military training.
Although Kennedy's Green Berets were heavily active in
Vietnam,

they caused widespread resentment among the

"conventional" forces there.

Emerson states that the

schism which developed between the special and
conventional forces was reflected later in the reduced
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budget for the unconventional forces in the post-Vietnam
era.

Terrorism played an important role in forcing a

change in the priorities of military commanders.
Specialized counterterrorism units became popular
in the 1970's— just as the incidence of terrorism
increased.

France organized "Groupement de Intervention

Gendarmerie National"
Headquarters Unit"

Israel,

the "General

(GHQ), West Germany,

"Grenzschutzgruppe 9"
"Delta Force."

(GIGN),

(GSG-9) and the United States,

the

U.S. personnel are chosen from the

Army's Ranger forces,

the Navy's SEALs and the Air

Force's Special Operations Command.

These highly trained

members excel in marksmanship skills,
that stress endurance and agility,

athletic abilities

intelligence

capabilities, psychological stability,

discipline,

willingness to function as a team and patience.

These

special forces are prepared to deploy the instant the
order is given, allowing decision-makers the option of
rescue operations or small commando attacks.
Unfortunately,

1?
^

the U.S. record of success in

special operations designed to intervene during a
terrorist situation is not very admirable.
Iran,

In 1980 in

the ill-fated hostage rescue attempt caused

skeptics to doubt the ability of U.S. forces to do the
job at all.

C ase St ud y #10

In 1985, TWA Flight 847 was hijacked while
enroute from Athens to Rome and the special forces again
had the opportunity to respond.

As the two Moslem

hijackers headed the plane toward Beirut,
centers in Washington,
what action,

if any,

crisis

D.C. were set up to determine

to take.

landed at Beirut, refuelled,
as a "goodwill" gesture.

The flight initially
and released 19 passengers

At the same time, however,

additional Lebanese terrorists entered the plane.

two

The

plane next landed at Algiers, where terrorist demands
were reinforced by the murder of U.S. Navy diver
Stethem.

Once Washington decided to activate the

special counterterrorist teams, requests were sent to
several governments for permission to deploy the
commandos.

Emerson reports that Britain, Malta,

Italy

and Israel responded favorably, while Egypt and Algeria
declined to allow U.S.
soil.

forces to operate from their

The commandos were prepared to act several times

1 *3
but diplomatic constraints prevented it. J

Eventually

the hostages were dispersed within Beirut and the U.S.
missed any opportunity for rescue.
The French counterterrorist unit, GIGN, has had
success in rescue operations.

In February 1976, they

rescued a busload of school children hijacked by
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terrorists.

And the Israeli success at Entebbe is

legendary as a classic example of a quick-reacting
hostage rescue.
The U.S. constraints of geographic distance/
non-cooperation from foreign governments and
bureaucratic indecision by policymakers,
obstacles to overcome.

Nevertheless,

are tough

the U.S.

should

strive to solve these problems in order to maintain a
capability to respond to an on-going terrorist crisis.
Although the main tenet of the U.S. policy regarding
terrorism is that of no concessions;
communication should be kept open.

the lines of
And, as with the

tests for the use of force in conventional military
intervention,

offensive action can play a vital role if

appropriate and used as a last resort.

If the terrorist

feels intervention of a hostage-taking incident may
occur,

leaders who direct activity may be deterred.

Covert Operations

A possible alternative to the public and
bureaucratic constraints placed on the use of overt
operations is the use of secret operatives to carry out
actions against terrorists.
Agency,

The Central Intelligence

under the direction of the President,

is the

only agency legally authorized to carry out "special
activities" or covert operations.

The National Security

Council
(OSP)

(NSC) established the Office of Special Projects

in 1948, which according to Celmer, was directed

to "plan and conduct covert operations.14 The OSP has
evolved into the present Directorate of Operations,
which represents the intelligence community's main asset
in combatting international terrorism.

The details

surrounding the CIA's involvement in counterterrorism
remain classified and,
Nevertheless,

as such, difficult to assess.

Robert Oakley,

former U.S.

Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism,

cited improved

intelligence collection as helping to deter more than
180 terrorist actions during a period of 18 months.

1R

The advantage of using covert resources to
implement foreign policy objectives is that it gives the
administration wide leverage in dealing with foreign
persons and governments without the fear of reprisals
from world opinion.

Covert operations entail such

activities as collecting intelligence information,
protecting against espionage and using various means to
affect international and political events in a certain
country that are favorable to U.S.

interests.

Covert

military operations launched during the Reagan
administration were a violation of U.S.

law and helped

point out flaws in the system of checks and balances.
In order to use CIA activities as a deterrent to future
terrorist threats,

the terrorists must be aware of the
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possible sanctions.

The nature of intelligence

operations performed by the CIA requires them to
maintain secrecy.

Therefore, covert operations designed

to use force against terrorists may not be consistent
with our laws and moral obligations.

Brian Jenkins

argues that,
...while covert operations may be necessary under
extraordinary circumstances, if we are obliged to
use force in response to terrorism we ought to do
so with the legitimately constituted armed forces
of this country— openly, and with an unambiguous
message as to who is responsible and why we are
doing it. 6
Summary

In a democratic society that strives to uphold the
"letter of the law," counterterrorist options that
include use of force require thorough examination.
While retribution is often the psychologically most
appealing response to a violent attack,

it also requires

the greatest amount of restraint in its use.

The

question of appropriateness as well as national security
considerations needs to be balanced against public
opinion and the deterrence value of the action.
Conventional forces are a strong tool of foreign policy,
but of limited utility in a fight against smaller, more
mobile forces.

Specially trained military forces offer

a better alternative when mounting rescue operations and
selected commando attacks against terrorist targets.
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Surrogate forces and covert operations, while
appropriate in the most narrow circumstances,

generally

are difficult to control and violate the essence of a
deterrence philosophy.

If the U.S. decides a terrorist

situation is best resolved with the use of force,

the

government should be willing to acknowledge that action
as a legitimate right within the bounds of legal and
moral constraints.
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Chapter VIII

Counterterrorism Model

The body of literature on the subject of terrorism
contains numerous models designed to guide analysis of
events,

assessments of existing threats and proposals of

response for the edification of policymakers.
conceptual models have some utility;

Most

all have

limita t i o n s .
In their heuristic model constructed on rule-based
computer systems, Waterman and Jenkins designate three
primary focal points of terrorist activities:
groups and contexts.1

events,

Events are defined as

individual terrorist incidents; groups referred to
identifiable and distinct organizations which employ
terrorist tactics.

"Context" is envisioned as including

local political structures,

economic aspects,

the

relative efficacy of law enforcement and security forces
and all other social,

governmental and logistical

factors which impact on terrorist situations.
heuristic device,

As a

their model facilitates the analysis

of events by methodically diagramming known information
and thereby highlighting what needs to be known.
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The authors describe wheels as analogies for their
important focal points.

The event wheel,

for example,

contains spokes with such information categories as
date,

time, group claiming responsibility,

of attack and location.

target, type

Similar focus "wheels" are used

to guide analysts in the development of information
concerning groups and c o n t e x t s .^
Most models developed for the analysis of
terrorism-related phenomena define variables in terms of
categories, hierarchies and spectra.
A typical two-dimensional analytical framework for
counterterrorism operations is set forth by Stephen
Sloan of the Airpower Research Institute.

O

The

framework (see Figure 1) is intended to facilitate force
selection and targets in terrorism preemption
operations.
In their report on state-sponsored terrorism,
prepared in 1985 for the U.S. Senate,

Cline and

Alexander conceive of the "spectrum of conflict" as a
continuum ranging from "normal economic and diplomatic
pressure" to "overt hostilities

(warfare)" with

intermediate levels of "destabilization,"

"subversion,"

"armed insurgency" and "guerrilla operations."4
intermediate levels collectively are termed

The
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"low-intensity conflict."

Cline and Alexander note that

the "elements" of low-intensity conflict often create
conditions leading to state-sponsored terrorism.5
Both of the above-designed models, while
functional,

illustrate the tendency to address in

isolation the various bodies of information needed to
assess available countermeasures.
As Alon points out in his examination of Israeli
countermeasures against Palestinian terrorism,

two

distinct levels of analysis are appropriate:
An "Extra-terror" perspective treats terrorism
as one of many casualty-producing phenomena,
ranked with drunk-driving and industrial safety.
An "Intra-terror" view is totally within "the
domain of terrorism" judging the applicability
of "individual countermeasures vis-a-vis
policy objectives."6
Similarly,

there exists an apparent tendency to

consider certain countermeasures as inherently more
intrusive and risky than others.

But the circumstances

and context of many terrorist situations would indicate
otherwise.

For example,

a covert operation,

usually

considered to carry high risk and involve complex
planning, may constitute a more straightforward
countermeasure than an economic situation.

The tendency

to consider countermeasures as hierarchical also creates
a "try and see" mentality in which escalating
initiatives are predictable and time-consuming.
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Perhaps a more realistic analytical model is one
which simultaneously considers the implementation and
probable effects of all possible countermeasures within
changing contexts.

An additional important feature of

such a model would be an interactive dimension,

i.e.,

the on-going assessment of how various countermeasures
affect the potentialities of others.
model,

Finally,

the

above all, must be capable of dynamic information

assimilation.

Rapidly changing international relations

is an essential analytical dimension given today's
complex web of transnational economic arrangements.
Leaders of a closely allied nation which share our
definition of a terrorist situation can easily become
recalcitrant when government economists explain the
implications of even extending moral support.

Application

The essential thrust of a dynamic model is to
reduce subjectivity at the analytical level and shift
value judgements to the decision-making level.

The

Waterman-Jenkins heuristic model serves this purpose
insofar as analysis is guided by pre-established
frameworks.
static

But the linkages between the essentially

"event" and "group" focal points and dynamic

"context" variables are provided by analysts who cannot
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help but be influenced by domain assumptions and
preconceived notions.
The dynamic model presented herein focuses
primarily on countermeasure packaging.

The model

(see

Figure 2) is a three-dimensional conceptualization of
the process that decision-makers should follow before
assigning an appropriate countermeasure.

The three

areas that should be considered include:
countermeasures, group

(terrorist)

the countermeasure is within.

and the context that

This model provides a

starting point for analysts to evaluate and compare the
consequences of actions with the affects the action will
have on the terrorist group.

Thus, policymakers are

provided with a range of countermeasures that can be
applied in most situations and that are not static or
hierarchical.
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